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GOOD FAITH THEORIES OF LENDER LIABILITY
Borrowers are suing their lenders with increasing frequency and are
often prevailing on the merits.' The awards in successful suits have been
large, sometimes quite spectacular. 2 Courts base these recoveries on a
variety of grounds, including federal statutes, 3 the common law theories
of duress, interference with contract, and fraud,4 and theories of fi-
duciary obligations between borrowers and lenders.' Increasingly, courts
and borrowers are resorting to another theory-that the lender did not
abide by his obligation of good faith. All of those cases loosely coalesce
under the term "lender 'liability." However, that term denotes more
than a collective reference to theories of law; it describes a marked
tendency of courts to apply well-established theories of law to the lender-
borrower relationship for the first time.
6
This article examines the good faith theories in isolation from the
other views of lender liability. The first section discusses the sources
and scholarly interpretations of good faith. The section also introduces
a theme running throughout this article, that good faith is a mechanism
Copyright 1988, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw.
1. See generally, American Bar Association, Emerging Theories of Lender Liability
(H. Chaitman Ed. 1985); American Bar Association, Lender Liability Litigation: Recent
Developments (R. Tufaro Ed. 1987) [hereinafter Recent Developments]; Granoff, Emerging
Theories of Lender Liability: Flawed Applications of Old Concepts, 104 Banking L. J.
492 (1987); Moss, Borrowers Fight Back with Lender Liability, A.B.A.J., March 1987.
2. See, e.g., K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985) (affirming
a $7.5 million jury verdict); State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1984) (affirming a jury award of over $18.5 million). Several larger awards are
currently on appeal; see, e.g., Robinson v. McAllen State Bank, No. C-1948-84-D (206th
D. Tex. 1987) (award of over $59 million); Kruse v. Jewell, No. 112439, Superior Court
of Cal., Sonoma County (1985) (award of $46 million), cited in Chaitman, The Ten
Commandments of Lender Liability, Recent Developments, at 633.
3. Litvack and Lobenfeld, Claims under Federal Law, RICO, Antitrust, and Bank
Holding Company Act, Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 247.
4. See, e.g., State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App.
1984).
5. See, e.g., Deist v. Wachholz, 678 P.2d 188 (Mont. 1984); Barnett Bank v. Hooper,
498 So.2d 923 (Fla. 1986). A Louisiana court rejected the possibility of a fiduciary
relationship between a borrower and lender in Busby v. Parish Nat'l Bank, 464 So. 2d
374 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1985). See also, Miller, Calfo & Levy, The Fiduciary Duty
of Lenders through Excessive Involvement or Control over Borrowers in Lender Liability
Litigation, Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 161.
6. Ebke & Griffin, Lender Liability to Debtors: Toward a Conceptual Framework,
40 Sw. L.J. 775; Cantor, Kerr & Rice, Lender Liability Theories, in Recent Developments,
supra note 1, at 74.
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for protecting expectations. Section two discusses the scope of the good
faith obligation in the lending transaction. The expansion into the line-
of-credit cases is presented as an example of the tendency to broaden
the scope of good faith and of the application of good faith theories
to lending transactions. The third section presents the exemption from
good faith obligations that follows the classification of a transaction as
a "demand note." Section four presents the debate in the case law over
the standard by which good faith should be judged in lender liability
cases. The final section analyzes the view that bad faith constitutes a
tort and examines the potential application of this theory to lender
liability cases. Each section investigates the interplay between the ex-
pectation-protection function of good faith and the particular aspect of
the good faith theory which is discussed in the case law.
THE SOURCES OF GOOD FAITH
The notion of good faith is neither a recent innovation nor limited
to the lender-borrower context. American case law has for some time
imposed an implied obligation of good faith in every contract. 7 Under
this rule, a party to a contract keeps good faith by doing nothing which
would deprive the other of the benefits of the deal." A highly developed
body of law defining the obligation in specific transactions has developed.
The Restatement Second of Contracts embraced the notion of an implied
good faith obligation.9 Much like the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.)
provisions, it required good faith in the performance or enforcement of
all contracts. 10 Both the case law and the Restatement were vague on
good faith, yielding guidance in certain fairly well-defined situations; a
party exercising discretion was bound to use good faith, but no general,
easily applied rule existed.
Most of the lender liability case law discussing good faith has been
decided under U.C.C. provisions. The drafters of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code expressly adopted the idea of good faith in fifty of the
Code's four hundred provisions;" three have been fertile ground for
the good faith theories. Section 1-20312 imposes the general obligation
7. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good
Faith, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 369 (1980).
8. Id. at 379-80.
9. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 (1979).
10. Id.
11. Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 666, 671 (1963).
12. La. R.S. 10:1-203 (1987) [hereinafter § 1-203]. Louisiana is in an extraordinary
position with regard to good faith; this state has two statutory sources of the obligation-
the article I provisions of the U.C.C. and La. Civ. Code arts. 1759 and 1983. While the
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of good faith, stating that "(e)very contract or duty within this Act
imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement."
In section 1-201(19),' 3 the Code defines good faith as "honesty in fact
in the conduct or transaction concerned." As defined, good faith is
determined by a subjective test. Section 1-208 '4 addresses a clause fre-
quently used by lenders, the so-called "insecurity clauses," which give
lenders discretion to accelerate the instrument. When these clauses are
exercisable "at will" or depend on the lender's insecurity, they can be
exercised only in good faith.15 Since these three U.C.C. provisions form
the basis for good faith theories of lender liability, the interpretations
given them by the courts will determine the course of those good faith
theories.
common law recognized good faith in fairly recent times, Louisiana's good faith provisions
trace back to 1808. A healthy amount of jurisprudence has developed around these
principles. See, e.g., Nat'l Safe Co. v. Benedict & Myrick, Inc., 371 So. 2d 792 (La.
1979); Waguespack-Pratt v. Ten-O-One Howard Ave., 449 So. 2d 657 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1984); Makofsky v. Cunningham, 576 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1978).
As the civilian notions of good faith are generally considered much broader than those
at common law, an interesting question remains as to which standard (if either) the
Louisana courts will apply. This paper proceeds on the assumption that the Commercial
Code will be applied to the lending contract, a basically commercial transaction. On the
civil code's good faith provisions, see generally 2 S. Litvinoff, Obligations §4 at 6, in 7
Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1969); Tete, Tort Roots and Ramifications of the Obligations
Revision, 32 Loy. L. Rev. 47 (1986).
13. La. R.S. 10:1-201(19) (1987) [hereinafter § 1-201(19)]. The U.C.C. also defines
good faith in Article 2. As applied to "merchants," good faith means "honesty in fact
and the observance of commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." U.C.C. § 2-
103 (not adopted by Louisiana) [hereinafter § 2-103). A number of cases have refused
to apply the broader standard of commercial reasonableness on grounds that lenders are
not merchants. See, e.g., Van Bibber v. Norris, 419 N.E.2d 115 (Ind. 1981) ("sales
transactions are more amenable to the establishment of 'reasonable commercial standards'
than are the relations between secured parties and debtors"); Sievert v. First Nat'l Bank,
358 N.W.2d 409 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) ("commercially reasonable conduct has no ap-
plication under the [U.C.C.] to negotiating loan refinancing"). No court has considered
the question thoroughly, and it is not implausible to classify lenders as merchants as a
matter of definition. Nonetheless, the contrast between § 2-103 and § 1-201(19) is sometimes
cited as a strong argument for a subjective standard. See infra notes 104-20.
14. La. R.S. 10:1-208 (1987) [hereinafter § 1-208]. The relationship between § 1-208
and § 1-203 is uncertain. Some courts treat the two as distinct inquiries in each case.
See, e.g., Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Willis-Denny Ford, Inc., 154 Ga. App. 846, 269 S.E.2d
916 (1980). One case stated that § 1-208 is a specific application of § 1-203. Jack M.
Finley v. Longview Bank & Trust, 705 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985). This article
proceeds on the assumption that the standard appled to judge good faith in § 1-203 and
§ 1-208 will not differ.
15. Courts had formerly policed abuse of insecurity clauses by making the paper
containing them nonnegotiable. Article 3 of the U.C.C. made it clear that instruments
containing acceleration clauses were negotiable, and that the problem of abuse was to be
handled under § 1-208. See U.C.C. § 3-109, official comment 4; 1 W. Hawkland, Uniform
Commercial Code Series (1982) § 1-208:01 at Art. 1, p. 206.
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The language of the U.C.C. provisions and the history of good
faith in the American common law fail to resolve difficult questions
arising from their application to concrete facts. Therefore, the writings
of scholarly commentators and the U.C.C. drafters will assume impor-
tance in determining how good faith will be applied. Professor Farn-
sworth provides one of the more useful commentaries on the subject. 16
Farnsworth distinguishes between good faith purchase and good faith
performance. Good faith purchase is a state-of-mind inquiry, closely
akin to notice. 17 Examples of its application are in the doctrine of bona
fide purchaser and in the test for holder in due course. Good faith
performance is a much broader doctrine which enjoyed a renaissance
in the U.C.C. 8 The implied term of good faith performance "[requires]
cooperation on the part of one party to the contract so that another
party will not be deprived of his reasonable expectations.' 9
Professor Summers argues for the broadest reading of good faith. 20
Courts should not attempt to define good faith, but should treat it only
as an "excluder." ' 2' A definition of good faith will then emerge from
cases excluding certain forms of conduct as bad faith. 22 The inquiry is
not governed by preconceived guidelines, but is an ad hoc determination
made by the trial courts:
If the obligation of good faith is to do its job, it must be open-
ended rather than sealed off in a definition. Courts should be
left free, under the aegis of a statutory green light, to deal with
any and all significant forms of contractual bad faith, familiar
and unfamiliar. 23
Another commentator has tried to clear up the matter by resorting to
more concrete theories. Professor Burton argues for an economic def-
inition of good faith. A party acts in bad faith, in Burton's view, when
he uses the discretion given him under the contract to take back some
of the opportunities he has foregone.2 4
The commentary is much more helpful in framing the standard by
which good faith should be judged. Farnsworth takes note of the sub-
jective standard apparently adopted in the general provisions of the Code
16. Farnsworth, supra note 11.
17. Id. at 668.
18. Id. at 669.
19. Id. at 671.
20. Summers, Good Faith in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 54 Va. L. Rev. 195, 201 (1968).
21. Id.
22. ld.
23. Id. at 215.
24. Burton, supra note 7, at 387.
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and the objective standard apparently limited to the sales articles, and
expresses the hope that the objective standard will be adopted as the
general standard. 25 Good faith performance, he notes, "properly requires
some objective standard tied to commercial reasonableness.' '26 Summers,
consistent with his views on the nature of good faith, argues that a
purely objective standard is critical to give good faith meaning. 27 Pro-
fessor Gilmore, in a frequently cited passage discussing good faith in
the context of acceleration clauses, notes that "[tihe creditor has the
right to accelerate if under all the circumstances . . . a reasonable man
would have done so.''28 On the other extreme is the legislative intent
argument. In Professor Braucher's view the standard is subjective since
the history of the Code and its revisions show the intention to adopt
a subjective standard. 29
These statutes and commentaries form the backdrop of the good
faith theories of lender liability. They are the sources from which courts
and litigants will draw in future lender liability litigation. Although
varied, the attempts to define good faith and the standard by which it
is judged reflect the underlying idea that good faith protects contracting
parties' expectations. 3 0 This is the core of the theory. The cases, both
those expanding the theory and those limiting it, frequently stray from
this central premise.- Yet only adherence to the true focus of good
faith-expectations-can guarantee an effective and meaningful remedy
for bad faith in lending contracts.
THE LINE OF CREDIT CASES AND THE SCOPE OF GOOD FAITH
The distinguishing characteristic of the recent wave of borrower
litigation has been the willingness of courts to expand theories of law
to find the lender liable.3 Nowhere has this been made more clear than
in the good faith cases. For example, good faith theories recently have
been applied to every stage of the lending relationship, from negotiation
25. Farnsworth, supra note 11, at 673-74.
26. Id. at 671.
27. Summers, supra note 20, at 205, 214.
28. 2 G. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 43.4, at 1197 (1965).
29. Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 Colum.
L. Rev. 798 (1958) ("[N]egligence [is] irrelevant to good faith." Id. at 812). Another
view minimizes the significance of the choice, suggesting that similar outcomes are reached
in either case. See 1 W. Hawkland, Uniform Commercial Code Series § 1-208:01, at 207
(1982); White & Summers, The Uniform Commercial Code § 26-3, at 1088 (1980).
30. Burton, supra note 7 at 371.; Burton, Good Faith Performance of a Contract
within Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 67 Iowa L. Rev. 1 (1981); Farnsworth,
supra note 11, at 669.
31. Ebke & Griffin, supra note 5.
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of the loan3 2 to the retaking of collateral.33 Some cases invoke good
faith to reverse previously settled rules.34 The most significant expansion
of good faith has come in the line of credit cases.
The line of credit is a transaction of convenience. The lender preap-
proves the borrower for a certain number of dollars in credit, and gives
him an account, or line, upon which he can draw. The borrower then
takes advantage of an expedited process for getting a loan, submitting
a request for an advance on the line rather than a new loan application.
The lender normally requires the borrower to submit periodic financial
reports in order to monitor the borrower's financial condition. However,
this arrangement presents a difficult situation when a financially troubled
borrower begins to depend on advances from the credit line. The bor-
rower's only hope of resuscitation may be an influx of cash, which is
precisely the function of the credit line. Yet the lender is quite naturally
concerned with throwing good money after bad. In recent cases courts
applied the good faith provisions of the U.C.C. to this conflict, and
several times held the lender liable for termination of the credit line.
The traditional view taken by courts is that a line of credit does
not obligate the lender to fund every request unless specifically provided
for in the contract. For example, in Midlantic National Bank v. Com-
monwealth General,3 5 the lender refused to advance on the borrower
corporation's $400 million line of credit after one of its subsidiaries
filed for bankruptcy. The court contrasted the line of credit with the
loan commitment, saying, "[A line of credit] does not impart upon the
bank the legal responsibility to loan up to the limit ... but merely
facilitates the easier extension of credit." 3 6 Without a showing of another
agreement, the lender could terminate the lending arrangement at will,
and without notice.
This rule was abruptly challenged in K.M.C. v. Irving Trust Co.37
The borrower was a mid-size wholesale grocery company and the lender
32. See, e.g., 999 v. CIT Corp., 776 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1985).
33. See, e.g., Alaska State Bank v. Fairco, 674 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1983).
34. See, e.g., Brown v. Avemco, 603 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979). The law seemed
settled that the good faith provision of § 1-208 did not apply where the borrower was
in breach of the loan agreement. See, e.g., Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code, § 1-
208:5, at 441 (3d ed. 1981); 1 W. Hawkland, Uniform Commercial Code Series, § I-
208:01, at 205 (1982). Nevertheless, the Brown court imposed the good faith limitation
although the borrower violated the loan agreement by leasing the secured property without
consent. The court held that even in the event of a technical breach, the lender must
exercise good faith.
35. 386 So. 2d 31 (Fla. App. 3d Dist. 1980); see also Grandin Indus., Inc. v. Florida
Nat'l Bank, 267 So. 2d 26 (Fla. App. 4th Dist. 1972).
36. Midlantic National Bank, 386 So. 2d at 33.
37. 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985).
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a New York bank. The business of wholesale grocering requires immense
amounts of capital; accordingly, the plaintiff established a large credit
line with the defendant. 8 The lending arrangement required that all of
K.M.C.'s accounts receivable be deposited in a "blocked account" over
which Irving had complete control. Those deposits were then immediately
credited against K.M.C.'s loan balance. 9 As a result of this arrangement,
K.M.C. depended entirely upon Irving for operating capital. 40
Three years into the lending arrangement, K.M.C. made a fairly
routine request for an advance on the credit line. 4' The amount requested
would have brought the balance on the line to its limit.4 2 Irving's loan
officer, Sarokin, refused to advance the funds. 43 With no capital available
to continue its business, K.M.C. began to collapse." Three days after
his initial refusal, Sarokin agreed to lend almost the full amount earlier
requested. However, the consent came too late, and K.M.C. liquidated. 5
At the time of the refusal, Irving was fully secured, holding an
interest in all K.M.C.'s accounts receivable and its highly liquid inven-
tory." The quarterly audits of K.M.C. showed that the lender would
suffer no loss in the event of liquidation, as it could recoup the entire
indebtedness by selling the inventory and collecting the accounts receiv-
able.47
The Sixth Circuit held that good faith required the lender to give
notice to K.M.C. sufficient to allow it an opportunity to obtain alter-
native financing or a buyer.4 1 Only if Irving could come forward with
a "valid business reason, ' 49 by which the court apparently meant some
belief of insecurity, could it avoid liability. Irving had the power over
the continued existence of K.M.C. No reasonable party would place
itself in that situation unless it expected good faith, which in this case
meant reasonable notice.5 0 The reasonable notice requirement came into
good faith by analogy to section 2-309, a sales article which requires
38. Id. at 754.
39. Id. at 759.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 762.
42. Id. at 754.
43. Id. at 763.
44. Id. at 754.
45. Id. at 762.
46. Id. at 762.
47. Id. at 763.
48. Id. The plaintiff's argument had been made before in Sahada v. Continental I11.
Nat'l Bank & Trust, 706 F.2d 193. (7th Cir. 1983). The Seventh Circuit noted but
sidestepped the issue, deciding the case on other grounds.
49. K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 763.
50. Id.
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reasonable notice before terminating certain long-standing relationships
between buyer and seller.5
Before K.M.C., it had been thought that the lender had complete
discretion over whether or not to advance funds on a line of credit.
The decision startled the lending community. The courts, too, quickly
responded to the decision, as several borrowers in litigation brought it
to their attention.
In Shaughnessy v. Mark Twain State Bank,12 the borrower had a
line of credit to develop real estate. Winter weather conditions halted
construction, and he informed the lender of his intention to renew the
project in the spring.53 When he did, the lender refused to advance any
funds.5 4 The borrower alleged bad faith on the part of the lender in
cutting off the credit line without notice. 5 The Missouri court chose to
distinguish the situation from that in K.M.C. Shaughnessey's credit line
did not involve a blocked account, therefore his alternate sources of
capital left him more protected than the K.M.C. debtor.5 6 Given that,
he could not claim that failure to give him notice of the termination
constituted bad faith. 7
A Florida court also took issue with the K.M.C. decision. In Flagship
National Bank v. Gray Distribution Systems, 58 a line of credit for
$400,000 was extended to a large distributor as part of a debt workout
plan. 9 This plan involved a lock box arrangement, one almost identical
that in K.M.C.60 Gray had no source of capital apart from the line.
The lender terminated the line of credit, and the borrower, unable to
purchase in large quantities, soon collapsed. 6' The borrower then sued
the lender, citing K.M.C. The Florida court affirmed the earlier decisions
which held that a lender was not obligated to fund a line of credit. 62
Nonetheless, the court went on to distinguish K.M.C. on several grounds.
Gray Was over his credit limit, and the lender had given some form of
51. Id. at 759.
52. 715 S.W.2d 944 (Mo. App. 1986).
53. Id. at 946.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 953.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 485 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
59. Id. at 1338.
60. The lender had Gray on an even tighter string than K.M.C. had been. The lender
controlled not only all influxes of capital, but also the checking account. The borrower
had to get preapproval of its budgets from the lender. Id.
61. Id. at 1339.
62. Id. at 1340.
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notice.6 3 Moreover, the course of dealing between Flagship and Gray
was much shorter. 64
It appeared that K.M.C. would be read narrowly, headed for death
by distinction, when the U.S. First Circuit Court of Appeals joined the
K.M. C. court's position in Reid v. Key Bank of Southern Maine.6 5 Reid,
a small painting subcontractor, maintained a credit line at Key Bank
for several years. Facing a large job, he arranged with the lender for
an extension of his credit limits to $25,000. 66 To secure the loan, Reid
assigned all his accounts receivable to the lender. 67 Apparently, the
assignment included a provision that all checks for Reid's work were
to be made out to the lender. 68 Two months after the new agreement,
the lender telephoned Reid to inform him that the Bank would advance
no further funds on his credit line. 69 For four months, the two parties
did not communicate with one another. During that time, the Bank
credited about one-third of a check sent to it against Reid's loan bal-
ance. 70 Reid failed to make the interest payments on the outstanding
balance, and, after Reid failed to respond to overdue notices, Key Bank
repossessed the collateral. 71 Reid filed for bankruptcy, and then filed
suit against the lender for terminating his credit in bad faith.7 2 He based
his claim on breach of the good faith duty, partially on grounds of
improper racial motivations. 7 The jury held the lender liable for bad
faith in its dealings with Reid.
The First Circuit upheld that verdict. The court first noted that
there was a right of action in contract based on good faith.74 As the
jury had been properly instructed, the only other question on appeal
was the sufficiency of the evidence. 7 Citing a laundry list of evidentiary
combinations which could have led to a finding of bad faith,76 the court
63. Id. at 1341. This is problematical, for the "notice" given was a refusal to lend
any more funds until the balance declined (through collection of accounts receivable). It
is questionable whether this was the form of notice contemplated in KMC.
64. Id.
65. 821 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1987). The citation of § 1-208 also rendered the KMC
holding "suspect" in the Flagship court's view. See infra notes 79 to 104.
66. Id. at 11.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 11-12.
73. Id. at 11.
74. Id. at 12.
75. Id. at 15.
76. Id. The court listed the following findings which the jury could have made: that
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decided that there was enough evidence to support the jury finding. All
of the evidentiary factors were unclear, but three findings appeared
critical: the lender's termination of the relationship shortly after ap-
proving the borrower for higher credit limits; the existence of possible
racial motivations; and the lender's failure to explore an alternative to
closing the credit line."
The line of credit cases present a rather confused state of affairs.
On the one side, courts are steadfastly refusing to give any real meaning
to good faith as a limitation on termination of a credit line. But it is
not implausible, and may be quite proper, to impose some limitation.
The line of credit vests, enormous discretion in the lender, and the
exercise of this discretion could devastate financially the borrower who
is dependent upon the line to any significant degree. Where there is a
long relationship between borrower and lender, certain expectations arise,
and these should at least be examined by courts. The line of credit
extension presents the very sort of situation to which the good faith
limitation was meant to apply.
The K.M.C. court, on the other hand, broadly expanded the notion
of good faith to include reasonable notice, analogizing to the notice
provisions in the sales articles. If good faith could include reasonable
notice provisions formerly confined to the sales articles, what else might
it include? That approach presents an alarming danger to the lender in
the name of protecting the borrower. Good faith protects expectations,
but both parties have legitimate expectations. Swift changes in the law
and broad impositions of new duties in the name of good faith could
impinge on the lender's idea of the terms of the arrangement. Despite
this expansive and unexpected reading of good faith by the Sixth Circuit,
K.M.C. did provide guidelines to future lenders. No matter how justified
the criticism of the rule, it is at least a rule. As shall be seen shortly,
not all courts have been so forthcoming.
In one sense the Reid decision is more satisfying than K.M.C. The
borrower in Reid was a small, unsophisticated player in a very complex
the last agreement could be seen as "the culmination of an ongoing and mutally beneficial
relationship"; that Reid was not in default and his position had not changed in any
signifigant degree when the termination occurred (it was significant to the court that the
lender had not complained of any deterioration); that the lender had not conferred with
the borrower before terminating the line, an ommission inconsistent with the bank's policy
(it was especially signifigant that the loan officer in charge had not testified); that the
bank was motivated by "ulterior considerations" (apparently racial), rather than a "good
faith concern" for its financial position; that the bank acted "in bad faith and without
notice to terminate the credit relationship as a whole"; and that the extension of credit
by the bank had "shown confidence in Reid" and "given him grounds to rely" on
continued credit. Id.
77. Id. at 15-16.
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game, not a large, powerful (and represented) business entity. Perhaps
it was proper to allow the jury greater flexibility in protecting the
expectations of such a borrower. However, the case is wholly unjusti-
fiable in another, much more important, aspect. The court does not
isolate any improper conduct by the lender, but rather gives a grabbag
of actions that might have constituted bad faith. This list is far too
broad to offer guidance. That is the type of decision which lenders
most fear. The Reid court utterly fails to alert lenders to what will be
expected of them, and in that sense represents the very worst application
of the good faith theories.
Courts and lenders can draw some lessons from the line-of-credit
cases. Lenders know that they must be cautious when entering long-
term credit line arrangements, and that it is dangerous to allow the
borrower to rely solely on the credit line for its capital. But beyond
this there is no more specific guidance. Courts addressing a borrower's
claim of bad faith can glean the proper approach from these cases,
though mostly by way of counter example.
Good faith is an appropriate limitation on the lender, but it must
be applied with care. To enlarge its scope suddenly and without expla-
nation is imprudent and dangerous, as is finding liability without ar-
ticulating the objectionable conduct or any rationale. Above all, courts
must learn to focus on the real issue: what has the lender done under
the agreement which violated the reasonable expectations of the other
parties? Protecting expectations is the purpose of imposing good faith
limitations in the first instance; therefore, courts must keep them fore-
most in mind when applying good faith.
THE DEMAND NOTE EXCEPTION
Another important category of cases deals with demand notes. Courts
faced with difficult questions of the lender's responsibility sometime seek
refuge in the "demand note" exception. This exception grew up around
the comment to section 1-208, which reads:
Obviously this section [limiting the exercise of acceleration clauses
to those made in good faith] has no application to demand
instruments or obligations whose very nature permits call at any
time with or without reason. This section applies only to an
agreement or to paper which in the first instance is payable at
a future date. 8
Several cases seized upon this language to create an exception to the
good faith obligation where the lending documents contained demand
78. U.C.C. § 1-208 official comment.
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language. Such cases hold that no matter how questionable the lender's
conduct, there will be no inquiry into good faith if the indebtedness
was due on demand.
A good example of the application of this doctrine is in Fulton
National Bank v. Willis-Denney Ford, Inc. 79 This case involved an
inventory financing arrangement between a car dealer and its bank. The
bank paid the factory invoices when new automobiles were shipped to
the dealer, and the dealer then executed a demand note in the bank's
favor.80 The bank decided to call the notes it held when it discovered
numerous irregularities in the dealer's operation and when the dealer
proved uncooperative in correcting them.8" The dealer obtained other
financing and sued the lender for breach of the obligation of good faith
under section 1-208 and section 1-203.82
The sole issue for the Georgia appeals court was whether the ob-
ligation of good faith applied to a demand instrument. Looking to the
legislative history and the comment to section 1-208, the court held that
it did not apply.83 As to the dealer's argument that the general obligation
of good faith must apply under section 1-203, the court curtly responded:
"[T]he only duty under the U.C.C. on a holder of a demand instrument
is to seek enforcement of [it] within the applicable statute of limita-
tions."14
That notion has been followed in more recent lender liability cases.
In Centerre Bank v. Distributors, Inc. ,8" the court also refused to consider
evidence of bad faith in the context of a demand note, but on entirely
different facts. The defendant-borrower was a distributing corporation
which purchased all of its inventory under a financing arrangement with
its bank.8 6 The loan was set up under a promissory note, due on demand,
with additional terms contained in a lending agreement.8 7 The owner
had personally guaranteed the note.8 Brown, a manager for defendant
Distributors, wished to buy the business. The highly leveraged business
could not operate without financing, so quite naturally Brown inquired
into the continued financing of the business.8 9 The loan officer informed
79. 154 Ga. App. 846, 269 S.E.2d 916 (Ct. App. 1980).
80. Id. at 916-17.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 918.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 705 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. App. 1985).
86. Id. at 45.
87. Id. at 44.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 45.
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him that while the transaction must obtain the approval of the loan
committee, there would be no difficulty, for the guarantor (seller) was
sufficiently wealthy. 90
Brown bought the business and at the bank's request delivered his
personal guaranty on the note.91 Three days after that, the bank notified
him of its intention to call in the note. 92 The bank extended the deadline
several times and agreed to a voluntary liquidation plan (which was not
instituted), but eventually repossessed the collateral and brought suit for
the deficiency. 93 Brown's claims of bad faith went unheeded. This was
a demand note, said the court, and limiting the call of the note by
good faith would "add an additional term the parties did not agree
to. 9994
More recent cases refuse to end the inquiry at the first hint of
demand language. The K.M.C. court expressed a willingness to apply
a good faith obligation to all demand paper.9 The lender had argued
that the demand language in the loan agreement eliminated any re-
quirements which good faith might impose upon calling in the loan.
The court rejoined:
[Jiust as Irving's discretion whether or not to advance funds is
limited by an obligation of good faith performance, so too would
be its power to demand payment. The demand provision is a
kind of acceleration clause, upon which the Uniform Commercial
Code and the courts have imposed a limitation of reasonableness
and fairness. 96
Other courts facing demand note arguments have chosen another
route: they simply refuse to characterize the lending agreement as a
demand instrument. In Shaughnessy, for example, the Missouri court
faced a loan arrangement very similar to the one in Centerre.9 This
court found that the terms of other parts of the agreement were in-
consistent with the demand language and that therefore good faith
applied. 98
The Reid court, addressing similar demand language, refused to find a
demand instrument which precluded good faith considerations." The
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 46.
94. Id. at 48.
95. 757 F.2d at 760 (1986).
96. Id.
97. Shaughnessy, 715 S.W.2d at 946.
98. Id. at 950.
99. 821 F.2d at 13-14
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court stated that the note in question was given along with a number
of other documents to form a line of credit. I°0 The lender could not
have enforced the note against Reid for its face value, for that amount
had not been lent.10 1 Therefore, the demand language could not "rep-
resent the beginning and the end of the inquiry into the time term of
the contract." 102 Other loan documents contained default provisions, and
oral testimony indicated that the repayment schedule was set by oral
agreement. 03 All of this countered the assertion of the bank, and good
faith could be considered.
Rigid adherence to the so-called demand note exception obfuscates
the true concerns. Rather than focusing on the exception, courts should
attempt to determine whether the expectations of the party were tread
upon by an exercise of discretion. Indeed, some courts have already
shifted their inquiry, such as in those cases more closely scrutinizing
the language in the lending agreements. This leaves the substance of
the demand note exception intact, for when the parties truly frame their
transaction in demand form there can be no expectation of a limitation
on its collection. At the same time, this approach would leave the courts
free to inquire into the lender's conduct, eliminating the cases in which
highly questionable conduct on the part of the lender goes unpoliced
by the courts. Courts would also be free to inquire into the relative
sophistication of the parties, something that has been notably lacking
in the demand note cases.
TiE STANDARD OF GOOD FAITH
Another line of cases shows that the disagreements among scholars
and commentators as to the proper standard of good faith has spilled
over into the courts. 104 Many cases apply, at least nominally, the sub-
jective standard. 05 A good case in point is Van Horn v. Van der Wol,
Inc.106 When the creditor learned of a rumor that the borrower had
been denied a loan application, he accelerated the notes he held.'0 7 The
loan had not, in fact, been denied. 08 The borrower defended the suit
100. Id.
101. Id. at 14.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See supra notes 26 to 29.
105. See, e.g., Bartlett Bank & Trust Co. v. McJunkins, 147 Il. App. 3d 52, 497
N.E.2d 398 (1986).
106. 6 Wash. App. 959, 497 P.2d 252 (1972); see also Annot., 61 A.L.R. 3d 244
(1975).
107. Id. at 253.
108. Id.
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on the notes by a claim of bad faith, claiming that the lender could
not reasonably have been insecure, and therefore could not have been
in good faith. 1°9 The court disagreed: "The standard is what [the lender]
actually knew, or believed he knew, not what he could or should have
known. Because [the lender] believed [the borrower] had been denied a
loan, and acted in accordance with that belief, he acted in good faith." 0
The rule did not stand in some later lender liability cases. In Black
v. Peoples Bank and Trust,"' the Mississippi Supreme Court faced the
issue of the standard. The court noted the criticisms of the objective
standard in the case law and cited Gilmore's comments." 2 It then resorted
to pre-Code law and applied an objective standard." 3 Likewise, the
K.M.C. court made it clear that there must be some objective com-
ponent." 4 Even if the loan officer in question had actually believed that
his decision to close the line was justified, the lender's conduct must
"to some extent . . . be measured by objective standards."" 5 In Reid,
the Sixth Circuit interpreted the trend in Maine case law as sharply
toward an objective standard." 6
Which test is best in the lender liability case? As the scope of good
faith expands, the courts will have to face that question. Proper analysis
will require consideration of the distinction between good faith per-
formance and good faith purchase.' 7 The standard for the first will not
necessarily be applied to the second. If courts addressing lender liability
cases are going to confront good faith, those courts must decide which
of the standards adequately protects the lenders' and borrowers' expec-
tations. There are three possibilities: a purely subjective test; a purely
objective test; or some combination of the two.
A purely subjective test would be the most advantageous to the
lender. To recover, the borrower would have to prove a dishonest state
of mind. Aside from the difficulties in proving intent, there is the
problem of risk. The borrower is subjected to his lender's risk aversity,
a factor which he can not control. The borrower is forced to behave
in a way which will not alarm his lender. Though an equity holder
(owner), the borrower is limited by the risk a fixed-interest holder (lender)
would take.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 254.
111. 437 So. 2d 26 (Miss. 1983).
112. Id. at 29.
113. Id.
114. 757 F.2d at 761.
115. Id.
116. 821 F.2d 9, 14.
117. See supra notes 17 to 19.
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The purely objective test is little better. In an unstable industry,
with a diverse group of lenders, a reasonable standard may be difficult
to ascertain. Furthermore, the situations in which the lenders operate
may require more leeway. For example, a lender faced with a borrower
going insolvent must decide whether to enforce his security or risk loss
of the amounts loaned; and the lender must do it quickly, for under
state collection law, "first in time is first in right.""' Within this
environment, it might be unrealistic to hold lenders to an objective
standard. Furthermore, as the cases have shown, there is a potential
for overexpansion of the doctrine of good faith so as to invade the
expectations of the lender, which a floating objective standard could
exacerbate.
The better approach would be to base the standard primarily on
the subjective beliefs of the lender, but create an objective limitation.
This seems to be the approach the K.M.C. court indicated." 9 The lender
will be given latitude in his decisions, but some claims are simply outside
the scope of permissible lending behavior. Put another way, certain
actions of the lender, such as foreclosing when fully secured and when
the borrower was not in default, invade too far the expectations of the
borrower. 120
TIE TORT OF BAD FAITH IN LENDER LIABIrY
There is some possibility that a tort of bad faith will emerge in the
lender liability cases. Tort liability for breach of the implied obligation
of good faith began as a response to abuses in the insurer-insured
relationship. '' The tort was based on a twofold rationale, that the
insurer and the insured enjoyed a "special relationship," and that con-
tract damages both undercompensated victims of insurer abuse and
undeterred the insurers. 22
118. This would become important, for example, where a lender bank sought to exercise
its right of setoff. See, e.g., Karner v. Willis, 238 Kan. 246, 710 P.2d 21 (1985).
119. 757 F.2d 752, 761.
120. White and Summers, supra note 31, suggest this form of an objective test in
judging the propriety of acceleration. It requires no great leap to apply it to all good
faith claims in lending transactions.
121. See Comment, Imposition of Punitive Damages for an Insurer's Tortious Breach
of Contract, 19 Conn. L. Rev. 329 (1987) [hereinafter Punitive Damages]; Comment, Tort
Remedies for Breach of Contract: The Expansion of Tortious Breach of the Implied
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing into the Commercial Realm, 86 Colum. L.
Rev. 377, 381 (1986) [hereinafter Tort Remedies]; Comment, Reconstructing Breach of
the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing as Tort, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 1291.
1293 (1985).
122. Comment, Punitive Damages, supra note 121, at 336; Lempert, California's Other
Lottery: Tort Actions on the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 7
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The special relationship rationale has formed the basis for the spread
of the bad faith tort doctrine from insurance contracts to other types
of contracts.' 23 Only a few cases address the possible application of the
tort of bad faith to lending contracts.'1' In Wagner v. Benson, 25 a
California court was willing to assume that breach of good faith in a
lending contract constituted a tort, but found no breach. The lender in
that case had financed an investment for the borrowers.126 When the
investment began to fail, the borrowers sued the lender, claiming that
it had a tort duty to disclose the risks in the venture. 27 Even if such
a tort existed, held the Wagner court, the lender's conduct was well
within the social norms imposed by tort law. 12s
The only reported case basing lender liability on the bad faith tort,
First National Bank v. Twombly, 19 was a relatively ordinary lender
liability case. The borrower had signed a promissory note calling for
one lump sum payment in the middle of August. 30 However, the lease
on the borrower's restaurant expired at the end of July, and negotiations
to renew had failed.' 3' The borrower, contacting the loan officer, secured
an agreement to convert the note to an installment loan.12 However,
the loan officer was going out of town, and the borrower was to complete
the arrangements with the lender's vice-president, whom the loan officer
was to inform of the deal.' 33
The vice-president, however, claimed to know nothing of the deal
when Twombly called. 34 As Twombly was unemployed, the vice-president
adamantly refused to convert the loan, and he insisted that the full
amount be paid then.' 3" Although the note was not due for another
Glendale L. Rev. 169, 178-79 (1986); Diamond, The Tort of Bad Faith Breach: When,
If at All, Should it be Extended Beyond Insurance Transactions?, 64 Marq. L. Rev. 425
(1981).
123. The bad faith tort has also been applied in employment contracts. See Lempert,
supra note 122, at 181. It has grown rapidly in the bank-customer contract cases. See,
e.g., Commercial Cotton Co. v. United Cal. Bank, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (Cal. App. 1985).
There are rumblings of even broader applications. See Comment, Sailing the Uncharted
Seas of Bad Faith: Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 69 Minn.
L. Rev. 1161, 1177 (1985).
124. See Annot., 55 A.L.R. 4th 1026 (1987).
125. 101 Cal. App. 3d 27, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1980).
126. Id. at 519.
127. Id. at 520, 521.
128. Id. at 521.
129. 689 P.2d 1226 (Mont. 1984).
130. Id. at 1228.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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two weeks, the vice-president decided to accelerate the loan and to offset
Twombly's checking account. 36 He based his decision only on what
Twombly had said and made no further investigation.
The Twombly court recognized the general rule that the good faith
obligation only gave rise to contractual remedies. But where, as here,
the duty "was imposed as a matter of law," the court stated rather
enigmatically, tort liability would result. 37 The court cited for this prop-
osition an employment case involving wrongful discharge of an at-will
employee,' a a case which itself relied on prior insurance bad faith cases.
It is unclear what the court meant, but perhaps implicitly it recognized
a special relationship between bank and customer analogous to that
between insurer and insured.
More recent cases reject the tort theories. In Rigby Corp. v. Boat-
men's Bank and Trust Co., 3 9 a Missouri court held that the U.C.C.
good faith obligations"O were contractual, and did not give a cause of
action in tort. The Eighth Circuit, ruling under Arizona law, faced the
same question in Betterton v. First Interstate Bank.14' Noting that the
Arizona Supreme Court had refused to extend the bad faith tort from
insurance to employment contracts, it predicted that it similarly would
refuse to extend it to lending contracts. 142 The borrower would be left
to contractual remedies alone.
In applying the special relationship rationale to lenders, courts would
only do in a roundabout way what they could do more cleanly under
the contract theories. The special relationship could be found only where
certain expectations had built up. Yet rather than focusing on these
expectations and protecting them between the parties, the court would
be forced, in order to justify application of the tort, to focus on the
relative positions of the parties. This would protect not their expectations,
but only those of parties similarly situated. Clearly the positions of the
parties would be relevant to what they expected, but it would not be
the ultimate consideration, and focusing exclusively on that factor would
lead to neglect of many other factors which bear upon the parties'
expectations. Thus, applying the tort rationale would be much less
effective in protecting the parties.
The practical significance of the theoretical difference between tort
and contract, the availability of larger damage awards, could justify the
136. Id. at 1229.
137. Id. at 1230.
138. Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 205 Mont. 304, 668 P.2d 213 (1983).
139. 713 S.W.2d 517 (Mo. App. 1986).
140. Referring to U.C.C. § 1-203 and § 1-208.
141. 800 F.2d 732 (8th Cir. 1986).
142. Id. at 736.
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application of tort theory if greater damages were necessary to protect
borrowers. The awards in lender liability cases, however, show fairly
convincingly that lack of damages will be no disincentive to sue on
lending contracts, as it may have been in the insurance contracts.
1 43
Moreover, as has been often noted, the expansion of damages in contract,
rather than the recognition of a new cause of action, is the better
response to the problem if it is found to exist.'"
Use of the tort theory could have a subtle effect on lender liability
cases proceeding under good faith: it might distract the court from
inquiry into the expectations of the parties while directing it toward the
relative positions of the parties. The tort theories could offer greater
damages to the borrower, but even if the expanded damages were
necessary, the same end could be as easily achieved using the more
traditional theory of good faith-contract. Left with a rationale unsuited
to the lender-borrower context, courts would be hard pressed to give
any real meaning to good faith.
CONCLUSION
Good faith centers on expectations, but courts addressing good faith
in the lender liability cases have frequently lost sight of this basic
proposition. This has caused some courts to fail to recognize the utility
of good faith in policing contractual behavior, while others have pro-
ceeded to recognize new and broader good faith obligations without
adequate articulation of their rationale. The line-of-credit cases are an
excellent example of the confusion that results when courts attempt to
apply an obligation without recognizing its theoretical basis. The demand
note cases also reflect this tendency, with some courts obstinately refusing
to go past the wooden exception no matter what the circumstances.
Only a few cases have gone further and attempted an expectation inquiry,
usually by scrutinizing the language and circumstances of the agreement.
Likewise, courts have struggled over which standard to use in judging
good faith without discussing which will best preserve expectations.
Examining the problem in terms of expectations leads to the conclusion
that a primarily subjective standard with a broad, objective limitation
best satisfies this purpose. Finally, the judicial discussion of the propriety
of the tort over the contract theories of good faith avoids the true
concern, protecting the parties' expectations. As the tort rationale does
not fit lending cases well, and leads courts even further from the primary
inquiry, it should be rejected. If courts are willing to confront the task
143. See cases cited supra note 2.
144. See Comment, Punitive Damages, supra note 119, at 357; Comment, Tort Rem-
edies, supra note 121, at 402.
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of developing expectation-consistent theories of good faith, those theories
of lender liability might prove beneficial. If they merely avoid the
difficult questions, as some have done, then good faith theories become
dangerous traps for lenders, and therefore fail entirely in their function.
Paul Matthew Jones
